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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council o f the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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This article looks at the development of EC Administrative Law. identifying 
two main theoretical trends. The first, or 'control' theory, approaches 
administrative law from the angle of citizen-state relations and from the 
viewpoint of the citizen. The second, or functional, approach is to treat 
administrative law as a body of rules designed for the implementation of 
policies. The article suggests that EC administrative law originated inside the 
second theory, in part because of its French antecedents. Over the years, 
however, the first theory has gained the ascendant. The consequence for EC 
administrative law of the alternation between these two positions has been 
juridification (by which is meant the objectivisation of administrative law 
through a continual process of regulation and rulemaking and. on the other 
hand, litigation and rul-interpretation. The article concludes by suggesting that, 
in the interest of healthy democratic development, more attention should be 





























































































(a) A Global Context
It is perhaps not surprising that those administrative lawyers, generally working 
in the common law world, who have experienced the full force of privatisation. 
'New Public Management'1 and the sudden tilt away from the interventionist 
towards the regulatory state, should question the role of administrative law. By 
and large the experience has proved a chastening one. in which the economist's 
values of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, together with an augmented 
accountancy concept of value for money', transmitted through audit.' have 
seriously challenged the classic procedural values of administrative law. Public 
law has lost ground and its sphere seems to be shrinking. While there is general 
agreement on the nature of the problems, there is as yet little sign that answers 
are emerging or will be forthcoming.
The context in which post-modern administrative law' is required to 
operate and the problems which it faces are of a global nature. Strange' warns 
of the threat posed by a new world order, in which ’the territorial boundaries of 
states no longer coincide with the extent or the limits of political authority over 
economy and society'. New power structures have emerged, vested in 
industrialists, commercial operators and those who control access to knowledge 
and information through information technology and the media. Globalisation 
has resulted in a shift of power from public to private actors, endangering the 
forms of statal democracy on which we have learned to rely for regulation.
Because the international and regional organisations in no way constitute 
supranational governments and because they narrowly focus on trade, they are freeing 
business from the traditional constraints imposed by national governments and 
societal interests without substituting some equivalent at the supranational level. The 
result is a strengthening of business, with transnational corporations less tied to states 
and national interests, and a weakening of the nation-state overall, and in particular of
I wish to thank friends at the European University Institute, especially Professors Yves Meny 
and Renaud Dehousse, for their generous support, and my colleague Richard Rawlings for his 
advice and help over the years.
1 On the development of which see, C. Hood (1991) "A Public Management for All Seasons" 
Public Administration, 69, 3; P. Hoggett (1996) "New Modes of Control in the Public Service" 
Public Administration, 74. 9; C. Hood (1995) "Emerging Issues in Public Administration". 
Public Administration. 73, 165.
: M. Power (1994) The Audit Explosion, Demos. See also C. Harlow and R. Rawlings (1997) 
Law and Administration, (2nd. ed.) Butterworths, Ch. 5.
3 S. Strange (1996) The Retreat of the Stale. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
Cambridge University Press, p.ix; S. Strange (1995) "The Defective State", Daedalus. 55. 124.
4 V. Schmidt (1995) "The New World Order Inc: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the 
Nation-State” Daedalus. 124, 75-6. See also A. Moravscik (1993) “Preferences and Power in 



























































































the voice of the people through legislatures and non-business, societal interests.
Economist Majone discerns' a global change in styles of governance, fastening 
on the unifying features of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation, fiscal 
retrenchment, economic and monetary integration and various policy 
innovations associated with the New Public Management paradigm'. The 
consequence is to limit the role of the interventionist or positive state, in 
particular by restraining its power to tax and spend, while enhancing the power 
of rule making and, hence, of the regulatory state'. Some public lawyers too are 
beginning to think in terms of a global era of administrative law', relating this 
both to the emerging post-modern forms of governance and to New Public 
Management.6 Thus Taggart again notes7 as factors which have 'fundamentally 
altered the political and social landscapes in countries around the world': 
deregulation, commercialisation, corporatism, downsizing of business and 
public administration and globalisation.
Globalisation, however, is seen as the terrain of private, rather than 
public law, often to the exclusion of the state which forms its traditional sphere 
of operation.8 Not surprisingly, public lawyers, thrown into a defensive 
position, have been concerned to assert a claim to the new terrain, for example, 
by asserting jurisdiction over proliferating regulatory agencies or (in the 
common law world) demanding a public law of contracts' In systems which 
recognise a sharp public/private distinction, the very foundations are shaken, as 
the worth of the basic distinction comes into question."
As Common Market, the European enterprise is a manifestation of these 
trends; as Community or Union, its supranational government' was designed to 
combat the same tendencies. The effect, as Muller and Wright caution, has been 
to loosen the regulatory grip of nation-states and increase the regulatory role of 
Brussels l::
5 G. Majone (1997) “Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance". 
Journal of Public Policy, 139-40.
6 See, e.g., A. Aman Jr. (1997) “Administrative Law for a New Century" in M. Taggart ted) 
The Province of Administrative Law, Oxford. Hart Publishing, 93.
7 M. Taggart (1997) “Introduction" in M. Taggart (ed.) The Province of Administrative Law. 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2.
8 G. Teubner (1996) “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society", in G. Teubner 
(ed.) Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth, and G. Teubner ( 1997) “Breaking Frames: The 
Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems", American Journal o f Comparative Law. 45, 149.
9 J. Black, (1996) “Constitutionalising self-regulation". Modem Law Review, 59, 24.
1. Harden (1992) The Contractinf’ State, Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
11 F. Dubois. M. Engueleguelé, G. Lefèvre, M. Loiselle (1993) “La contestation du droit 
administratif dans le champ intellectuel et politique" in J. Chevallier (ed.) Le Droit administratif 
en mutation, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 159-70.
W. Muller and V. Wright (1994) “Reshaping the State in Western Europe: The Limits to 
Retreat in W. Muller and V. Wright (eds) The State in Western Europe Retreat or Redefinition 




























































































To an extern which is not fully appreciated, the EU is slowly redefining existing 
political arrangements, altering traditional policy networks, triggering institutional 
change, reshaping the opportunity structures of member states and their major 
interests. These interests are now increasingly entangled in relationships at four 
territorial levels: the international, the European, the national and the local, and for 
some of these interests it is by no means clear that the national level is the most 
important.
Majone firmly classifies the Community system of governance as regulatory in 
character, ' in which centralisation and executive policy discretion, so long the 
target of national administrative law systems, have given way as toofs of 
government to regulation, or rather ’a combination of deregulation and re­
regulation, possibly at a different level of governance'. Discretion has not, of 
course, been eliminated; it has changed its plumage and habitat. If any system 
of administrative law needs to face up to the problems posed by globalisation, it 
is that of the European Community. Doctrinally, its failure in this respect is 
rather striking.
(b) Administrative Law: Alternative Traditions
Theories of administrative law can loosely - 1 stress this word - be classified 
into two broad groupings. The first group, which I shall here describe as 
'control theories', see legal control of government as the core of the subject. 
These theories stress law's function in controlling administration and accord to 
courts the central place in the struggle for control. Typically, such theories are 
highly individualist in their concern for private rights. In one classic definition 
of the type, Piva, an Italian public lawyer,14 defines public law as 'the law 
which regulates the relationship between the State and its citizens... mainly and 
specifically aimed at regulating the relation between the State, on the one hand, 
and courts on the other'. A more vivid definition comes from Wade's classic 
English textbook:15
A first approximation to a definition of administrative law is to say that it is 
the law relating to the control of governmental power. This, at any rate, is the heart of 
the subject... The primary purpose of administrative law is... to keep the powers of 
government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen against their abuse. 
The powerful engines of authority must be prevented from running amok... As well as 
power there is duty. It is also the concern of administrative law to see that public 
authorities can be compelled to perform their duties if they make default... The law 
provides compulsory remedies for such sitiuations, thus dealing with the negative as 
well as the positive side of maladministration.
11 G. Majone (1996). Regulating Europe, London, Routledge.
u P Piva (1995) "An Introduction to Italian Public Law", European Public Law, 299-300.
15 HWR Wade and C. Forsyth (1994) Administrative Law, Oxford, Clarendon (7th ed.). 5-7. 
Harlow and Rawlings, above note 2, describe this as a 'red light' theory because of the emphasis 
on controls. See also M. Loughlin (1994) Public Law and Political Theory, Oxford. Clarendon, 




























































































The thrust of control theories differs strikingly from those in the second 
grouping, which 1 shall label instrumentalist theories.'6 What links these 
theories is that they look outwards rather than in; to put this differently, they are 
essentially administration-centred. Bureaucracy is accepted and welcomed as an 
essential tool for effective policy-making and governance, and law seen as an 
instrument for the proper implementation of policy. For instrumentalists, 'law' 
is widely interpreted so as to include legislation and regulation, and rulemaking 
becomes a central task for administrative law.17 The French administrative 
lawyer, Charles Debbasch, provides a typical definition from this school ls. 
Debbasch takes his subject to be 'the administration and the law applicable to 
if. It is significant that he specifies in order of importance; structure, activities 
and, last, control. Eisenmann too,19 noting the similarity to definitions used in 
the nineteenth-century French treatises of Jèze2ü and D uguir1, describes the 
'classic' tradition of French administrative law as concerned with all the special 
rules relative to the functioning of the public services'. In other words, the 
structuring and systematisation of the administration and administrative 
processes take precedence over control and more especially over external 
control by courts, typically seen as antipathetic to the bureaucratic enterprise 
Thus Delvolvé deplores" the extent to which 'the importance of the judgements 
of the Conseil d'Etat in the elaboration of administrative law has led to the 
equation of administrative law with the law created by the administrative 
judge'. He regards the conflation as misleading and stresses the importance of 
other sources, primarily codification but increasingly 'constitutional and 
international norms'.
Clearly the French Conseil d'Etat was from the outset positioned so as to 
define administrative law by reference to the administration or public service 
over which it was steadily assuming jurisdiction, while its institutional position
1(1 See G. Frug (1984) “The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" Howard Law Review, 
97, 1277, though Frug, who classifies administralive law into four ideal-types, groups 
instrumentalist theories under the 'model of expertise', a term with special resonance in the EC 
context (see below). Loughlin, above note 15, calls them 'functionalist'. See also M. Loughlin, 
“The Pathways of Public Law Scholarship" in Geoffrey Wilson (ed.) (1995) Frontiers o f Legal 
Scholarship, New York, John Wiley. Harlow and Rawlings, above note 2. use the label green 
light theory', which could prove misleading here.
See the seminal work of K.C. Davis (1969) Discretionary Justice: a preliminary inquiry. 
Louisiana State University Press.
C. Debbasch (1976) Institutions et droits administratifs, Paris, Presses Universitaires de 
France, p. 17. Compare J. Griffith and H. Street (1965) Principles of Administrative Law, 
London, Pitman (3,d ed ).
C. Eisenmann ( 1982) Cours de droit administratif. Paris, Librairie Générale du Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, vol.l, 17.
‘ fe r principes généraux du droit administratif. Paris, 1926 (3rd ed.).
L. Duguit (1926) Leçons du droit public général, Paris, Boccard ; Traité du droit 
constitutionnel, 5 vols., Fontemoing (3,d ed.) 1927-30.




























































































at the heart of French government had an effect on the concept of 
administrative law developed by scholars. In this way we see that the 
predominant tradition of administrative law is necessarily shaped by historical 
experience and culture. In most European countries, administrative law 
developed over a period starting in the late nineteenth century. In most 
European countries too, the constitutional context was one over which the 
eighteenth-century notion of separation of powers exerted a considerable 
influence, though to a different extent and in very different versions. To 
illustrate, the emergence of a distinct public law system in France was 
organically linked to historical experience, crystallised in Article 13 of the 
celebrated Law of 16-24 August 1790, which barred the competence of the civil 
courts in administrative matters.23 This forms the background to, and starting 
point of, French administrative law.24 At least after it had emerged as a 
significant constitutional force in France, a strong and systematised public law 
was the predictable outcome of the separate jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat. 
In contrast, in England, the ideology of liberalism which dominated throughout 
the formative nineteenth century, togethei with the institutional strength of the 
judiciary established after the Revolution of 1688, led to the installation of a 
unitary jurisdiction. In this institutional framework, protection of private 
interests seemed as natural as the dominance of the Diceyan version of the rule 
of law ideal.25
In reading what follows, it is important, however, always to bear three 
things in mind. First, while in any given system one tradition may dominate, 
each is likely to be represented. Thus we should be careful not to deduce that 
the protection of private interests has no place in French administrative law. 
Eisenmann indeed marks26 the existence of both traditions in France, surmising 
that the split seems to reflect different views of administrative law, perhaps 
even a different vision'. The same is true of common law jurisdictions where 
alternative, instrumentalist, traditions exist in both Britain and the United 
States, evolving in the wake of American 'New Deal' politics.'7 Secondly, we 
must remember that these are not the sole theoretical approaches to 
administrative law. To mention possible alternatives, a model of rational
21 J-L. Mestre (1985) Introduction historique au droit administratif, Paris, Librairie Générale 
de Droit et Jurisprudence.
Thus A. de Laubadère (1967) Manuel de droit administratif, Paris, Librairie Générale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence (8th ed), p. 5, who adopts an intrumcntalist definition of 
administrative law as 'the law applicable to the administration', goes on to devote his first 
chapter to judicial control by the administrative judge which he describes as 'the basis' of French 
administrative law.
~5 J. Allison (1996) A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on English Public Law, Oxford, Clarendon. See also, Loughlin, above 
note 15, Chap. 7.
26 Above, note 19. The alternative tradition in France is especially connected to the name of M. 
Hauriou whose (1927) Précis du droit administratif et du droit public, Paris, Sirey ( I Ith ed.) is 
equally a classic of French administrative law.




























































































decision-making and reasoned adjudication has become influential in modern 
Anglo-American administrative law,28 while the American 'civic republican’ 
tradition has been adapted as a possible model for EC law."* Third, the French 
and English systems to which I have so far turned for examples are not 
representative of every national tradition. Scandinavian societies, lor example, 
provide a classic case of administrative law systems in which a litigation 
culture has been slow to develop 10 and in which the ombudsman has emerged 
as the primary means of redress for citizens suffering injury by the 
administration.
To sum up, definitions are not, as is sometimes supposed, purely 
descriptive and neutral. They form part of a larger political di urse and 
reflect ideology and political persuasion. Similarly, administrative law systems 
develop within a constitutional context and culture which influences their 
development and in which typically they are deeply embedded.
(c) Community, Culture, and Context
In contrast to national legal systems, the emergent systems of law and 
governance in the Community lacked both culture and constitutional context. 
The institutional world of Europe has always been inchoate and remains in a 
situation of constant flux revolving around inter-governmental conferences. 
Evolving as an international organisation, the Community has never become a 
state,31 though it possesses some statal characteristics. The Treaties, described 
by some as a constitution, undergo a constant process of change. The Member 
States cannot decide whether they are moving towards, or away from 
federation, whether Europe will emerge as a Union or a Community of 
nations.32 Significantly too when control theories are considered, the 
Community possesses no independent or developed concept of citizenship, a 
matter of the utmost concern.33 Perhaps more significant still, the EC professes 
democracy without being democratic. Thus the fragility of its political
"s C. Harlow (1995) “A Special Relationship? The American Influence on English Public 
Law", in 1. Loveland (ed.), Lessons from America, Oxford, Clarendon; Harlow and Rawlings, 
above note 2. 100-118; P. Craig (1990) Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America. Oxford, Clarendon. 1990.
P. Craig (1997) “Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative 
Assessment". European Law Journal, 3, 105.
30 J A. Jensen (1997) "Judicial Review of Legislative Acts”, European Public Law, 3. 295 and 
for Sweden, see H.H Vogel (1997) “Swedish Administrative Law in a State of Change", 
European Public Law, 3. 26-30.
11 ECJ, Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996, Accession by the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1996) ECR I- 
1759.
"  See, J. Weiler (1981) “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism", 
Yearbook of European Law, 1,267.





























































































institutions, inherently perilous, necessarily reflects on the legitimacy of its 
legal order, while the constitutional balance intrinsic to the separation of 
powers ideal is dangerously absent. In other words, while in every Member 
State the administrative law system forms part of a working democracy, this is 
not the case in the Community.
But even if it was not bom into a recognizable legal culture, the infant 
legal order was quick to develop one. The pervasive ideology of market 
embodied in the 'four freedoms' swiftly gamed overriding constitutional 
status.3 Integrationism, characterised by an eminent judge as 'a ^genetic code 
transmitted to the Court of Justice by the founding fathers',’ shaped the 
mindset of the Luxembourg judges. With Van Gend en Loos.36 the doctrine of 
supremacy took shape, to assume the character of a primary law on which 
secondary principles could be, and soon were, predicated.
Where were these principles to come from? The cursory guidance given ' 
to the Court in EC, Art. 215 suggested that, with respect to the legal liability of 
the Community institutions, the common legal heritage of the Member States 
should be invoked. This may have been the case at first (as with the audi 
alteram partem principle of English law37 or the German proportionality 
principle ). They were, however, rapidly to lose their derivative character and 
assume by a careful process of selection the shape most fitted to the needs of 
the Community legal order. The turning point, given the limited scope of EC, 
Art. 215, which makes reference only to the non-contractual liability of the 
Community institutions and servants, had been the wider application of the 
axiom. Here the Court of Justice followed French administrative law down the 
path first of formulating general principle and second, of awardinc it semi- 
constitutional status.39 For Schwarze. the process has been consistent' 1
34 E-J. von Mestmacker ( 1994) "On the Legitimacy of European Law", RahelsZ. 58. 617.
13 F. Mancini and D. Keeling ( 1994) "Democracy and the European Court of Justice", Modern 
Law Review, 57, 175-86.
36 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederhmdse Administrate der Belastingen 11963) ECR 1.
37 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission 11974 ) ECR 1063. See 
generally, J. Schwarze (1992) European Administrative Law. London. Sweet and Maxwell, 
from p. 1434.
3A ibid., from 855.
34 For development in the Court of Justice, see A. Lorenz (1964) “General principles of law: 
their elaboration in the Court of Justice of the European Communities". American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 12; A. Akehurst (1981) "The Application of General Principles of Law by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities", British Yearbook of International Law, 52, 
29. For the previous French experience, which proved seminal, see M. Letoumeur (1951) “Les 
principes généraux dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat". Etudes el Documents du Conseil 
d'Etat, 19,
411 J. Schwarze (ed.) (1996) Administrative Law under European Influence, Sweet & 
Maxwell/Nomos, 17 (emphasis mine). See also Y. Galmol (1990) “Réflexions sur le recours au 




























































































Looking at the method chosen by the Court for developing a European administrative 
law, it becomes clear that the law of the Member States has served as a reservoir and 
source of knowledge. Using the method of an evaluative comparison of the national 
legal principles, jurisdiction (sic) has regularly tried to find the solution that is mosi 
compatible with the legal order of Community law and that most closely corresponds 
to the functional capacity and the goals of the Community
To put this rather differently, while the Community legal order borrowed 
principles, they were interpreted in the light of a wholly different mindset and 
set of objectives,41 New and original principles, such as the fidelity principle 
derived from EC, Art. 5 or the notion of a 'level playing field' of rights for 
Community citizens premised on the controversial doctrine of 'direct effect', 
began to emerge.
Since both the judicial system and its procedure were modelled on 
French precedent,12 the emergent EC administrative law system was, if 
anything, 'genetically programmed' towards instrumentalism, the definitions, 
theoretical structure and even, perhaps, predominant mindset of which could 
have been expected to prevail. There were, however, significant countervailing 
tendencies.
First, the ideology of market permeates the Treaties and informed the 
Commission. The Commission was neither a classic department nor a supra­
national administration but resembled, and was intended to function as. a 
regulatory agency, standing between public and private sectors. Second, both 
Court and Commission were infused by the dominant ideology of 
integrationism. They shared a common perspective, and a closer alliance 
evolved than is customary in the Member States. While in respect of direct acts 
of Community administration (i.e., administrative processes operated directly 
by the Commission), the respective roles of Commission and Court at first sight 
resemble those found inside many national systems, on closer examination the 
role of the Court has been less peripheral than is normally the case with a more 
self-confident and established public service under the control of a determined 
executive. A partial explanation must be the absence of settled practices and a 
body of administrative custom to draw on, though here again, the influence of 
the French model, where a close relationship between administration and 
administrative judge is institutionalised, should not be under-rated. On the 
other hand, we must note as a third significant reason for failure to embed an 
instrumentalist mindset, the absence at EC level of the jurisdictional divide 
between private and public law which had proved so formative in France.
administratif. 6. 254-260.
Jl See R. Dehousse (1994) “Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of the Level of 
Analysis", American Journal of Comparative Law, 42, 761-7.
' M. Lagrange ( 1978) “La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes: du plan Schuman à 




























































































A fourth reason lies in the arrangements for judicial review. Individual 
access to the Court of Justice is strictly limited by the standing requirements of 
EC, Art. 173, which requires that interest to sue must be both direct and 
individual. The Court has found a way round this problem in the doctrine of 
direct effect', which permits individuals to sue in national courts. Access to the 
Community legal order for individuals is then ensured by insistence on the use 
by national legal orders of preliminary reference procedure of EC. Art. 177.4' 
Not only did this development heighten the role of individuals in a system 
originally arranged for states and institutions but it also moved to centre stage 
the protection of individuals as an objective for EC law: a switch of objectives, 
if you like, from instrumentalism to control.
Fifthly and finally, a balance may have been provided by Member States 
with radically different 
differs sharply from 
obscurely) opines:45
... the principle of lawfulness of the administration and the implementation of 
administrative judicial protection are inseparably related by the ribbon of the principle 
of the due course of law. It is only by court control that the law is binding for 
administrative acts with the necessary efficiency as required by lawfulness. Therefore 
scepticism, as observed in many European countries in the past, e.g., in Great Britain, 
towards administrative jurisdiction, was not easy to understand, at least from the 
German point of view.
Perhaps then the sharp shift of EC law towards this position should be 
interpreted as a victory for German public lawyers. Schwarze's influential body 
of work on European administrative law is certainly court-centred. Scattered 
throughout his writing, one can trace his perception that EC administrative law 
is increasingly created by Commission rules, practices and procedures, 
emerging through regulation of public procurement and other economic 
activity. His major treatise,46 however, focuses on judge-made principles, 
failing significantly to draw any distinction between constitutional and 
administrative law. Here the author reflects the early jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice and perhaps also a German prototype, where the Basic Law helps to
traditions, notably Germany, whose public law tradition 
that of France.44 As Brenner (admittedly somewhat
44 See for discussion, H. Rasmussen (1980) "Why is Art. 173 Interpreted Against Plaintiffs?”, 
European Law Review, 5, 114.
44 For the anti-discretion bias of German administrative law, see G. Nolle (1994) “General 
Principles of German and European Administrative Law - A Comparison in Historical 
Perspective", Modem Law Review, 57, 191. On the influence of the Basic Law, see K. Goetz 
and P. Cullen, “The Basic Law after unification: continued centrality or declining force?” in P. 
Cullen and K. Goetz, (eds) (1995) Constitulional Policy in a Unified Germany , London. Frank 
Cass.
44 M. Brenner (1997) “Administrative Judicial Protection in Europe: General Principles", 
European Review o f Public Law, 9. 595-8. (emphasis mine).





























































































infuse citizens' rights, entrenched at constitutional level, through the different 
levels of governance.
To summarise, the striking emphasis on jurisprudence, seldom critically 
examined by commentators; the conceptual, dogmatic, or 'thin' version of the 
Rule of Law theory which infuses the Court's doctrine of legal equality; the 
Court's prioritisation of judicial remedy in the name of the Rule of Law; are all 
symptomatic of classic control theory. In the absence of any strong theoretical 
literatyre, however, the stance often has to be inferred. An important article on 
procedural rights, for example, states47 that 'the identification of the relevant 
general principles of law and their translation into concrete rules which govern 
administrative proceedings are to a large extent tasks for the Community 
courts'. This is not questioned or seen as contentious.
This is not to say, however, that the Court's operation of its traditional 
control function has on every occasion been strict enough to satisfy the more 
extreme of the 'control theory' commentators, who tend to see the 
Commission/Court relationship as closer than it should be. The Commission's 
influence on the jurisprudence of the Court is unquestionable. It is represented 
in all but a handful of cases before the ECJ and its legal service prepares 
written observations. There is considerable interchange too in the personnel of 
the two institutions. This helps to ensure that the Commission is strategically 
placed to influence legal policy and may help to explain also the findings of a 
recent study48 that Commission written observations provide a correct 
prediction of the final outcome of cases in 83% of Art. 177 preliminary 
references - a somewhat surprising finding when we remember that Art. 177 
references concern the dovetailing of EC and national law.
The Court of Justice has nonetheless been criticised for being less 
protective of the 'citizen' than the Court of Human Rights in cases concerning 
the 'rights of the defence' in the administrative process.411 When the
47 K. Lenaerts and J. Vanhamme (1997) “Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the 
Community Administrative Process”, Commnon Market Law Review. 34, 531 (emphasis mine).
48 A. Slone Sweet and T. Brunell (1997) "The European Court and the National Courts: A 
Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References. 1961-1995" . Harvard Jean Monnet WP 14/97, 
Harvard Law School.
See. e.g„ Cases 47/87. 227/ 88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859; Case 85/87 Dow 
Benelux v Commission [1989] ECR 3137; Case 374/87 Dow Chemicals Iheria v Commission 
Cases 87-99/87 [1989] ECR 3165; Orkem v Commission (1989] ECR 3283 noted S. Flogaitis 
(1992) “Droits fondamentaux et principes généraux du droit administratif dans la jurisprudence 
de la Cour de justice - trois arrêts en matière de concurrence". Revue européenne de droit 
public. 4, 291. For comparison, see Funke v France [1993] EHRR. 15, 297, noted with similar 
jurisprudence from the Court of Human Rights by A Sherlock at 11993] European Law Review. 
465- 468, where the same point is made. See also. R. Brent (1995) "The Binding of Leviathan - 
The Changing Role of the European Commission in Competition Cases ', International and 
Comparative Law Quaterly. 44. 255. For further consideration see C. Harlow (1996) 




























































































Commissions regulatory powers are in issue the Court has tended to pav regard 
to the 'objectives of general interest' pursued by the Commission.50 The 
competing stances are neatly encapsulated in the Technische Universität case,51 
involving the rights of the defence before a technical committee. A gross error 
had been made by a committee of experts advising the Commission in assessing 
liability to customs duty for the import of an expensive telescope. The 
university appealed and a preliminary reference reached the Court of Justice. 
The Advocate-General thought a hearing before the committee unnecessary: 
'Having regard to the number of decisions that have to be taken, one must be 
wary of placing on the administration an excessive burden by insisting on a 
time-consuming procédure contradictoire'. On this occasion, the Court, 
however, stood firm, ruling:
The right to be heard in such an administrative procedure requires that the person
concerned should be able, during the actual procedure before the Commission, to pul
his own case and properly make his views known on the relevant circumstances, and.
where necessary on the documents taken into account by the Community institutions.
A more cogent example involves the Court’s lenient attitude to the Commission 
in its use of the power to bring defaulting Member States before the Court 
under EC, Art. 169. Here the Court has allowed the Commission a wide margin 
of discretion. The point arose in an early case where Lord Betheli MEP, 
Chairman of the Freedom of the Skies Campaign, tried to re-open a 
Commission decision not to pursue Member States over air fare cartels. His 
action was ruled inadmissible for want of standing under EC, Art. 173, on the 
ground that, as he was not the addressee of the decision, he was not 
individually and directly affected.52 The Advocate-General was clearly 
uncomfortable with the position and indicated the need for a wider right to 
challenge Commission discretion, (which still remains unchallengeable). This 
could, of course, be read as an instrumentalist tendency on the part of the Court 
of Justice, anxious to leave room for negotiation between the Commission and 
defaulting Member States over non-compliance.5’ It could, on the other hand, 
be read as a failure to stimulate the growth of a necessary public interest action 
in EC administrative law and bring out into the open for investigation possibly 
suspect dealings between the Commission and other powerful actors on the 
transnational political scene.54
We have seen that classic control theory sees the role of courts and
Foot", European Law Journal, 2. 3. i
50 See, e.g.. Case 4/73 Nold v Commission 11974] ECR 491.
51 Case C 269/90 Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v Technisclie Universital München [1991] 
ECR 1-5649. See further below, text at note 77.
s: Case 246/81 Lord Betheli v Commission [ 1977) ECR 2277.
5’ See, F. Snyder (1993) "The Effectiveness of EC Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques", Modem Law Review, 56, 19.
54 C. Harlow (1992) "Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice’ , 




























































































administrative law as the protection of the citizen or individual against the 
state. When this idea is translated into the usage of Community law. however, 
we have to note two significant twists. In practice, the direct relations of the 
Community institutions with citizens are limited, typically, the Community 
operates through the institutions of the Member States while its competence 
remains limited and centres around the Single Market. The consequence is 
twofold. On the one hand, the 'individual' to whom reference is constantly made 
in the context of debates over rights, human rights and EU citizenship, is in 
practice usually a corporate body. On the other hand, the 'state' against which 
the citizen' typically merits protection under EC law is, strangely, the Member 
State, while the wrongful act or illegality in respect of which protection is 
granted is a disregard of EC law. To put this differently, the direct interface 
between citizen and state is replaced in EC law by a triangular relationship, 
while the dualist character of the EC legal order, which requires the EC.I to 
operate through national courts, further transforms the character of 
administrative adjudications. There are obvious sources of tension here, 
opening the Court of Justice to charges of partiality in imposing on Member 
States standards of conduct not expected of the Commission and Community 
institutions.
A notable illustration of this point is provided by the controversial 
jurisprudence on state liability. As indicated above, under EC, Art. 215, the 
Community institutions can be liable for loss caused through their acts and 
activities. The rules devised by the Court of Justice, supposed to be patterned 
on the law of the Member States, are generally regarded by commentators as 
restrictive, more especially in cases concerning acts of a legislative characters<>. 
Françoviçh57 dealt with the different case of a Member State, whose failure to 
incorporate a directive on compensation of redundant employees had ultimately 
resulted in loss to the applicants. It is sufficient to say that the Court imposed a 
duty to compensate on defaulting Member States. The judgement provoked 
criticism, however, in that it seemed to apply a higher standard of liability to 
Member States found to be in breach of the obligation to incorporate EC law 
correctly into the national legal system than on the Commission for loss caused 
by invalid or illegal activity. This differential treatment was actually justified in 
later cases by the Court's Advocates-General, at least one of whom refused to 
see any parallel between the situations.58
55 See text at note 117 below.
T C. Hanley (1994) The Foundations of European Community Law, Oxford. Clarendon (3rd 
ed.) 470-507; H. Bronkhorst (1988) "The Valid Legislative Act as a Cause ot Liability of the 
Communities in H. Schermers, T. Heukels and P. Mead (eds) Non-Contractual Liability oj the 
European Communities, The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, 13.
57 Joined Cases 6. 9/90 Francovich and Bonafaci v Italy 119911 ECR 1-5357.
Opinion of Advocate General Lomas in Case 5/94 R v Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
exp Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR 1-2553. paras. 101.2 and 142.3. In Case C 46/93 
Brasserie du Pécheur SA v Germany [1996) QB 404 (paras. 61, 67), A-G Tesauro is more 
circumspect, calling the argument 'not completely baseless'. An unusually mixed reaction may 




























































































Further problems arise as the relations of citizens with national 
administrations become destabilised through contact with the EC system. 
Horizontal equality is then endangered; i.e.. in similar situations, the rights of 
citizens under national and EC law may differ. In a number of highly publicised 
cases, rules of national administrative law have been forced to give way before 
the 'superior' legal order. In Johnston.56 for example, a national statutory ouster 
clause had to bow before the 'general principles' of EC law; in Emmoit.611 a time 
limit had to be disregarded when its effect was seriously to inhibit judicial 
protection of EC rights; while in Factortame61 a statutory provision which stood 
in the way of an interim remedy was disapplied. A situation had developed in 
which national administrative law and - more important - constitutional law 
might have to bend in response to the wholly different ethos, culture and 
requirements of the advancing Community legal order. In this way. the 
constitutionalisation of basic administrative procedures as general principles of 
Community law' allows them to be diffused through national administrations, a 
development already noted. Thus the Hevlens case6: established (i) a general 
principle of effective judicial protection and (ii) a duty to inform parties to an 
administrative decision of the reasons for that decision. The formulation 
suggested that the procedures themselves possess constitutional weight, a 
tendency no doubt encouraged by the fact that EC, Art. 190. embeds the right to 
reasoned decisions into the Treaty. We then find the commentators 
unquestioningly describing the rights of the defence as 'principles of higher 
rank which prevail over all other rules'.63
The right to a judicial hearing established by Hevlens and Johnston is 
protected in parallel by ECHR, Art. 6(1 )w and the expansive jurisprudence of 
the Court of Human Rights. This, as Abraham has observed65, threatens to 
absorb the major part, if not the whole, of administrative decision-making.
standards: see especially Case C-392/93 R r HM Treasure- ex p British Télécommunications 
11996] ECR 1-1631.
v< Case 222/84 Johnston v Royal Ulster Constabulary [ 19861 ECR I651.
611 Case C- 208/90 Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare (1991] ECR 1-2925. Once again, later 
cases backtrack: see. e.g.. Case C -188/95 Funtask A/S and others v Induslriministenet 
(EhrvervsministerietI 2 December 1997, Bulletin No 33/97, 3.
61 Case 221/89 R v Secretary of Stale for Transport ec p Factortame (No J) (1991] ECR I- 
3905 and 11991] I AC 603.
6: C 222/86 UNECTEF V Hevlens (1987) ECR 4097,
61 Ixnaerls and Vanhamme. op. cit. note 47. And see R. Lanwaars (1994) ‘'Rights of the 
Defence in Competition Cases", in D. Curtin and T. Heukel (eds) Institutions and Dynamics of 
European Integration, The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, vol. II. 506.
64 Art. 6( I ) provides: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him. everyone is entitled lo a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
65 R Abraham (1997) “Les principes généraux de la protection juridictionnelle administrative 





























































































expanding from adjudicative procedure into the administrative process and 
collapsing the established boundary between penal and administrative 
proceedings - a perverse and unintended consequence of the Article!
In briefly chronicling these developments, we can see the focus of 
European administrative law shifting to and fro. As Schwarze observes, 
initially interest lay in the construction of a system of administrative law for the 
Community; in other words, a system applicable to Community institutions and 
Community administrative procedures. Today, harmonisation and integration of 
national systems has moved rapidly up the agenda. Though he does not give 
this development whole-hearted approval, Schwarze clearly regards it as 
inevitable. In the light of the emphasis placed on the concept of subsidiarily in 
the Maastricht Treaty,67 this viewpoint is clearly challengeable. It must be said 
also that the development needs much more careful consideration than it is 
currently receiving from academics. We may be on a course damaging to the 
institutions, structure and culture of national constitutional and legal systems. 
In detaching administrative law too fast from its cultural environment, harm 
may be caused to the structure of national constitutions, legal orders and 
administrative systems. This will inevitably impact on the Community legal 
order and administrative process, undercutting the pillars on which the 
Community stands. There is a further risk that the search for a single model of 
administrative justice will produce stagnation, impoverishing our different legal 
traditions and draining the pool of ideas for experimentation.68
II. FUTURE IMPERATIVES
(a) Regulation and Control
The starting point for a more detailed consideration of EC administrative law 
must be its institutional context. As already indicated, the Commission differs 
from typical national administrations, which operate against strong political 
systems and inside a separation of powers culture. It lacks sizeable bureaucratic 
resources and depends heavily for implementation on national and regional 
administrations and on agencies in the Member Stales. Consequently, it has 
emerged as a policymaker or policy entrepreneur69 with a strategic position in 
the lawmaking process guaranteed by its right of initiation (EC, Art. 155). The 
best analogy, as already suggested, is to a regulatory agency, possessing a 
typical mix of rulemaking and enforcement powers. It could be seen as a bundle
66 J. Schwarze (ed.) (1996) Administrative Law under European Influence, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell/Nomos, 14-6.
67 TEU Art. G(5) inserting new EC Art. 3(b), soon to become ToA Art. 5.
68 Abraham, op. cit.. note 65.
B. Laffan (1997) “From policy entrepreneur to policy manager: the challenge facing the 
European • ommission". Journal of European Public Policy. 4, 422. See also, T. Christiansen 
(1996) A maturing bureaucracy? The role of the Commission in the policy process” in J. 




























































































of regulatory agencies represented by the DGs. Separate agencies are just 
beginning to be added. Derived from EC, Art. 235, these have legal personality 
and are semi-independent of the Commission.70 As yet the majority possess 
only advisory functions but. as and when they evolve towards true regulatory 
agencies, they will present similar accountability problems.
In Majone's regulatory state, traditional conceptions of control' are seen 
as inappropriate. For Majone, control occurs through 'self-policing mechanisms 
which are already present in the system'. This means building:71
a network of complementary and overlapping checking systems instead of assuming
that control is necessarily to be exercised from any fixed place in the system'
The control systems envisaged by Majone are: ’oversight by specialised 
congressional committees, presidential power of appointment, strict procedural 
requirements, professional standards, public participation and judicial review'.
Based on an American model, most of these controls are notably absent 
in the Community; it is indeed precisely for this reason that judicial power has 
assumed such a significance. We know from the American experience that a 
combination of strict procedural requirements with over-extensive judicial 
review has led to a stalemate situation from which American administrative law 
is just beginning to retreat.72 Significantly, Shapiro has predicted7' a parallel 
move to judicialisation of EC administrative procedures, based largely on the 
reasons requirement of EC, Art. 190, a development rendered more likely by 
the market culture described earlier. (This point is developed below).
(b) Rulem aking procedures
At national level, accountability for lawmaking functions is through the 
democratic process, a pattern which in practice tends to disguise the 
administrator's role as policymaker and draftsman. The democracy deficit of the 
Community means that the customary parliamentary control has been
70 See, A. Kreher (1997) “Agencies in the EC - a step towards administrative integration in 
Europe”, Journal o f European Public Policy. 4. 225; M. Everson (1995) “Independent 
Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters". European Law Journal. I, 180
71 G. Majone (1996) Regulating Europe. London. Routledge, 39. The theory of interpolahle 
balance' presented there is borrowed from C. Hood, "Concepts of control over public 
bureaucracies: comptrol' and interpolable balance'" in F-X. Kaulman el al. (1991) 1'he Public 
Sector, Berlin, de Gruyter. 347-66.
72 For diverse assessments see M. Shapiro (1986) "APA: Past, Present and Future" Virginia 
Law Review. 72. 447; R. Pierce Jr. (1996) “Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act". 
Tulsa Law Journal. 32. 185; B. Schwartz (1996) “Adjudication and the Administrative 
Procedure Act", Tulsa Law Journal, 32. 203.
72 M. Shapiro (1996) "Codification of Administrative Law: the US and the Union". European 
Law Journal. 2. 26 and M. Shapiro (1992) "The Giving Reasons Requirement". University oj 




























































































weakened. To date, the response to democracy deficit has been to demand a 
stronger European Parliament.74 An instrumentalist approach to the EC 
lawmaking process, given the Commission's central place and acknowledged 
function as policy innovator, would be to deal with all Commission rulemaking 
as analogous to executive rulemaking powers in France, where rulemaking is 
treated as a legitimate ancillary to the administrative function, independent 
from the rulemaking powers of the legislature, and subject to control by the 
administrative judge.'5 This would on the one hand justify close scrutiny by the 
Court find, on the other, encourage innovation and experiment by the 
Commission.
The Comitology, nominally the Council's representative in Commission 
lawmaking procedures but actually a prime example of bureaucratic capture - a 
forum in which Community civil servants meet those of the Member States - 
needs to be made more transparent and accountable.7,1 The Technische 
Universität case mentioned above77 in fact involved a technical committee 
exercising a quasi-judicial function and not a legislative or advisory committee. 
The concerns of the Court about accountability are nonetheless directly relevant 
to the Comitology. In his Opinion, the Advocate-General stressed the need for a 
technical committee to be both expert and impartial; the dominance of Member 
State representatives on the committee meant that this criterion had not been 
met. At national level, the value of expert objectivity might receive less 
emphasis in view of the political control exercised by an accountable 
government and the ultimate-control of the legislature. In the case of the EU, 
where political control is limited and where national interests almost inevitably 
figure, the same cannot be said. Working secretly, the Comitology is an 
unaccountable technocracy operating at the heart of the Community which is 
capable of acting unfairly and which needs to be controlled. Standard 
administrative law values of openness, impartiality, reasoned and rational 
decisionmaking should be introduced.
Procedural change to allow for a democratic and collective input into 
administrative rulemaking is under consideration in many common law 
countries including the United Kingdom.78 Transparency, increasingly seen as a
14 Though see R. Dehousse (1995) "Constitutional Reform in the European Community. Are 
there Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue9", Wes/ European Politics, 18, I 18.
CE 6 Dec. 1907 Cie des chemins de fer de lest el untres Rec 913 concl. Tardieu; M. Long el 
al. (1991) Les grands arrets de la jurisprudence administrative, Paris, Sirey (9lh ed.). Case No. 
19 and the note thereunder.
76 E. Vos (1997) "The Rise of Committees", European Law Journal, 3. 210; C. Joerges and J 
Neyer (1997) “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The 
Constitutionalistation ot Comitology", European Law Journal, 3. 273.
Case C 269/90 Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v Technische Universität München 11991 ] 
ECR 1-5649. Above, text at note 51.
See for the UK (1992) Making the Law: Report of the Hansard Society Commission on the 
Legislative Process, London, Hansard Society; for Australia see. Rulemaking by 




























































































fundamental democratic value, is rapidly climbing to constitutional level in the 
European Union71' with the requirement added to TEU Art. A that decisions be 
taken 'as openly as possible'. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, a new EC Art. 191a 
will give citizens a right of access to EP. Council and Commission documents. 
Dissatisfaction with the slow progress to date has provoked a litigation strategy 
designed to secure greater openness, though so far without great success.80
The Commission has already been experimenting with new ideas 
designed to allow collective access to the rulemaking process. It publishes 
proposals on the Web and encourages public comment. The inauguration of a 
public consultation stage through a 'European public square' is an ingenious 
idea81 made possible through the new technology. The Maastricht Social 
Chapter introduced a new form of rulemaking negotiated by the social partners, 
which can then be formally adopted by either the Commission or Member 
States. ‘ There is a parallel here to an American introduction. The Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act8’ aims to bring together interested parties in the initial stages 
of rulemaking. Once an act is designated for negotiation, a 'convenor' is 
appointed to facilitate a negotiated outcome which is then referred back to the 
agency for consideration. The purpose is to avoid the lengthy and convoluted 
procedures imposed on administration by the courts through the machinery of 
the Administrative Procedures Act. This suggests that Social Chapter 
procedures could be considered in other contexts.
(c) Administrative Procedures: Hard or Soft Law?
I have argued elsewhere84 against general administrative procedure codes in the 
context of harmonisation of national administrative procedure. Chiti also 
expresses scepticism,85 on the basis of respect for national legal and
Government Publishing Service, 1992. And see Harlow and Rawlings, above note 2, 165-7.
74 J. Lodge (1994) “Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy". Journal oj Common Market 
Studies, 32. 343; D. Curtin and H. Meijers (1995) "Access to European Union Information: An 
Element of Citizenship and a Neglected Constitutional Right" in N Ncuwahl and A. Rosas 
(eds.) The European Union and Human Rights. The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff.
8(1 Case T-194/94 Curvet and Guardian Newspapers v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2769: Case C- 
68/94 Netherlands i Council, Case T -105/95 WWT- i Commission 11997] 2 CMLR 55
81 See J. Weiler (1997) "The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest 
Proposals" European Law Review. 22, 150.
82 S. Fredman (1998) “Social Law in the European Union: The Impact of the Lawmaking 
Process” in P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds) 7he European Lawmaking Process, Dordrecht. 
Kluwer.
*’ Pub. Law No. 101-648 (1990), No. 104-320 (1996) I 10 Slat. 3870. See also Aman. above 
note 6. 105-8.
84 C. Harlow (1996) "Codification of EC Administrative Procedures? Fitting the Foot to the 
Shoe or the Shoe to the Foot", European Law Journal. 2. 3. Sec also, M. Shapiro (1996) 
"Codification of Administrative l.aw: the US and the Union", European Law Journal, 2, 26.
85 M Chiti (1997) "Towards a Unified Judicial Protection in Europe (?)". European Public 




























































































administrative cultures: 'It is not by chance that some countries have never had 
a procedural code, and they do not seem to desire to have it' It is in any case by 
no means certain that such a code could be implemented given the differing 
levels and styles of administrative organisation in the Member Stales. This is 
not to say that national administrations are not undergoing a process of 
convergence86 but. even assuming that the process will one day be completed, it 
is at present by no means complete. Codification is therefore premature.
The same is probably true of procedure at Community level In the 
majority of the areas where the Commission is directly responsible for 
administration (eg., competition, state aids or anti-dumping) Commission 
procedures are well-established and have for a long time been formulated in 
regulation. Hard law is sometimes a necessity. If public procurement law, for 
example, really needs to be uniform throughout the Community, it must be 
incorporated in Community regulation or directive; similarly if, as has been 
suggested,87 administrative contract law needs to be harmonised. Certainly the 
law applicable in contracts with the Commission seems a proper subject for 
rules debated and published openly to meet standards of good administration.
Yet formal or codified rules constantly have to be rewritten as they 
become outdated. It has for example been suggested that, because competition 
procedures date back to EC Reg 17/62, they are 'no longer up to modern 
procedural standards’.88 This situation invites the lawgames which are a feature 
of juridified systems. The more formal the procedure, the harder it is to agree 
change. A continuous process of litigation and judicial intervention is 
inaugurated, followed by rule-change triggering further litigation. The French 
have resolved the problem of rule-change with a standing Commission on 
Codification at the heart of the French Conseil d'Etat. This is a formula which 
could perhaps be adopted at Community level, with a Commission working 
group or committee plus specialist advisers whose task it is to take procedural 
rulemaking forward.
Rulemaking incites frustrated managers to devise techniques for evasion. 
The staff procedures of the Commission's own bureaucracy are frequently 
evaded by the use of short-term contracts - a public/private transformation 
familiar in NPM.8" The recent Green Paper on Public Procurement1" assumed 
that procedures must be 'transparent', in other words, encapsulated in clear
86 K. Goetz and J. Hesse (1992) "Early Administrative Adjustment to the EC. The Case of the 
Federal Republic ot Germany". Jahrhuch fur Europaische Verwaltungsgeschichle. 4, 181.
A. Bleckmann (1992) “Le droit européen communautaire dans la domaine du droit 
administratif in B. de Witte and C Forder (eds). The common law of Europe and the future of 
legal education. Dordrecht, Kluwer, p. 161.
C-D. Ehlennann and B. Drijber (1996) “Procedural Prolection of Enterprises: 
Administrative Procedure. In Particular Access to Files and Confidentiality", European 
Competition Law Review. 7, 375.
86 M. Freedland ( 1994) "Government by Contract and Public Law", Public Law, 86.




























































































rules. Bui Arrowsmith argues'11 that this may ultimately paralyse evolution 
because, under rule-based systems:
the focus tends to be on compliance with the rules rather than with the quality of 
results, which can lead to a situation where even within the limited area of discretion 
open to them, procurement officers engage in unduly cautious behaviour to minimise 
legal errors.
In areas such as that of state aids, where the Council has been notably reluctant 
to legislate, 'soft law' has proved the best way forward.1' Generally, the 
flexibility of soft law is useful. If unsuccessful it can easily be withdrawn. The 
regulator also gains discretion in implementation.9’ Soft law can be negotiated 
and can thus be used as a basis for harmonisation, especially in areas where the 
Commission shares administrative responsibility with a Member State (e g., 
with structural funds, regional grants or the Common Agricultural Policy). 
Guidelines allow administration of grants to be broadly the same in the various' 
Member States but give sufficient flexiblity to allow the scheme to be properly 
embedded in national bureaucracies. We must also bear in mind the problems 
of federal systems and remember that national administration is increasingly 
being downsized and its tasks downloaded. Soft law allows policies to be 
operated at regional level, taking account of the particular sensitivity of regions 
to their own culture and independence. At a later stage, negotiated rulemaking 
may be able to provide a bridge between informality and formality.
Soft law can also avoid undue judicialisation, though admittedly there is 
always the danger that courts will intervene to enforce procedures through 
doctrines of legitimate expectation.94 Where this principle allows for policies to 
be withdrawn in terms of due notice, plus an opportunity for any person 
affected to make representations, it is probably not too harmful. To allow the 
doctrine to create substantive rights9 is, however, unwise. It will almost 
certainly result in defensive administration, designed to avoid the ripple effects 
caused by the application of individuated judgements to a wide range of other, 
similar cases.
1,1 S. Arrowsmith (1997) “The Way Forward or a Wrong Turning'.’ An Assessment of EC 
Policy on Public Procurement in Light of the Commission's Green Paper". European Public 
Law , 3. 389-401. (
9‘ G. della Cananea (1993) “Administration by Guidelines: The Policy Guidelines of the 
Commission in the Field of Stale Aids" in Schriftenreihe der Europaischen Rechtsakademie 
Trier.
91 See further. F. Snyder (1994) “Soft Law and Institutional Practice in (he European 
Community" in S. Martin ted.) The Construction o f Europe. Essays in Honour oj Emile Noel. 
Dordrecht. Kluwer.
94 See J. Schwarze (1992) European Administrative Law. London, Sweet and Maxwell. 938.
9' On which see. P Craig (1996) "Substantive legitimate Expectations in Domestic and 




























































































(d) Accountability and Monitoring
With rulemaking as our point of departure, we have moved the discourse of 
administrative law sharply inside the parameters of instrumentalist theory But 
rules are not in themselves sufficient to ensure a high standard of public 
administration. The classic nineteenth-century machinery of an independent 
inspectorate is still the preferred management tool in public service-oriented 
administrations. In contrast, (he preferred technique of NFM to secure this 
central objective has been contract, closely linked to performance indicators 
and published standards, while value-for-money audit has been the favoured 
method of accountability %. In this context, EC, An. 4, inserted at Maastricht, 
which emphasises the special importance of the Community Court of Auditors 
and invites 'other Community institutions to consider... ways of advancing the 
effectiveness of its work' is significant. The Court's main weapon is its special 
reports, which can be hard-hitting and which may attract an unaccustomed 
degree of media attention. Whether audit can ever work satisfactorily in a 
system of low political visibility and debate, in which political accountability is 
under-developed is, however, a moot point.
Alternative dispute resolution provides an adjudicative parallel to soft 
law. Maastricht brought the European Ombudsman (EO) on to the European 
scene.1,7 The EO stresses his role in ensuring 'good administrative practices' and 
has already published a list of practices which he sees as faulty, adding 
significantly: 8
The experience of national ombudsmen shows lhal it is better not to attempt loo strict
a definition of what may constitute maladministration. The open character of the term
is justly one of the elements which distinguishes the role of ombudsman from lhal of
the court.
The way in which this approach may differ from that of a court can be seen 
Irom a group ol complaints9'7 concerning Commission refusal to use Art. 169 
procedure. It has to be said that the number and style of the complaints suggests 
a determined use of the EO for the type of political lobbying becoming so 
familiar at national level. All the complaints concerned the United Kingdom's 
alleged failure to carry out environmental impact assessment before the 
building of the Newbury by-pass, a matter falling outwilh the EO's jurisdiction. 
They were therefore presented as an attack on Commission procedure. 
Although the EO was in the event unable to help directly, the outcome was 
nonetheless important. Examination of the file to ensure that the decision to 
close it had been taken in conformity with general principles of good 
administrative behaviour, caused the EO to criticise the procedures for lack of 
transparency. He also noted the considerable dissatisfaction expressed by
% See note 2 above.
97 TEU Ans 8d. I38e: ToA Arts 21, 190.
98 Annual Report of the European Ombudsman for 1995, 17-8.




























































































'European citizens, some of whom regard the Commission's approach to the 
discharge of its responsibilities under Art. 169. as arrogant and highhanded'. He 
asked the Commission to conduct a general examination of the procedural 
position of individuals in Art. 169 procedure with a view to reform. This is 
already under way.
It is not of course unknown for the Court to make similar 
recommendations to the Commission. In Tradax,1011 for example, the Advocate- 
General advised that the Commission should 'as a matter of good administrative 
practice, though not as a legal obligation' grant access to pertinent information. 
Unlike ombudsmen^ however, courts cannot follow up their judgements to see 
them implemented1 " and have no monitoring procedures to trace the ripple 
effect of their judgements inside the administration. Moreover, they cannot 
choose their cases. In common with ombudsmen in some Member States, the 
EG is empowered to act suo moto. Although he expects to utilise this power 
sparingly, he has announced his intention to use it where multiple complaints 
'suggest that a more general inquiry would be appropriate'.10'
To summarise, one can see the evolution of EC administrative law thus 
far as a perpetual clash between two sets of values, each in its own way geared 
towards control, but differing as to the object and manner of control. The 
traditional constraints imposed by national governments from which commerce 
and capitalist interests have been freed by globalisation are reinstated by the 
regulatory institutions of the EC, whose mission is legitimated and facilitated 
by instrumentalism. The ideology of control, on the other hand, has largely 
been to the profit of international capitalism, an interest still more strongly 
embedded in the culture of the Community. Control theory allows Community 
powers to be emasculated by the very interests the Community set out to 
regulate. Finally, the intervention of a third dimension special to the 
Community, liie perceived need to prioritise the interests of the new legal order, 
has pushed EC administrative law off course as control of the state has come to 
be conflated with control of the Member States.
m  Case 64/82 Tradax \ !984] ECR 1359.
101 This is not true of the French Conseil d'Elat. whose Section du Rapport has the duly to see 
unimplemented judgements enforced: see Annual Reports of the Conseil d Elat lor details.




























































































III. LAW'S EXPANDING EMPIRE
Majone has described103 the exponential growth of EC regulation since the 
1960s as 'a major theoretical puzzle'. The only puzzlement is Majone’s. The 
twin techniques of modem public administration have been rulemaking and 
regulation, the two have, indeed, been described as mirror images'."1' 
Regulation implies rulemaking and rulemaking is merely one side of the 
phenomenon of juridification, a term coined to describe the tendency of modern 
and post-modern societies to formalise and encapsulate all social relations in 
terms of law.
An alternative way to theorise this phenomenon is as a move from trust' 
societies, in which elite groups are both trusted and trust each other, to a grid' 
society, in which obligations are imposed on individuals by external 
authorities.106 Public administration in the modern state, with its mass public- 
services, ranging from revenue raising through grant aid to social assistance, 
has inevitably veered sharply towards the 'grid' model. The preeminence 
accorded to the equality principle in modem society has undoubtedly expedited 
this tendency. Ironically, the Community itself emerged as a group' or trust' 
culture, in which actors and institutions were bound together by a shared belief 
in integrationism and the European enterprise. The advent of the Community 
has, however, aggravated the trend towards the 'grid' model, both because of 
the Community's centralising effect and because of its disruptive impact on 
national policy networks. The implementation of the Single Market programme, 
the introduction of the Comifology and the mistrust which began to surface 
around the time of Maastricht, were all factors pushing Community 
administration towards juridification.
The EC has made its own substantial contribution to juridification On 
the regulatory side, an average of 25 directives and 600 regulations per annum 
in the 1970s rose to 80 directives and 1.5 thousand regulations by the early 
1990s, when Brussels actually issued more regulation than France.10, Merely to 
incorporate, Member States 'have been forced to develop new regulatory 
capacities to an unprecedented extent'.108 There is widespread concern at the 
effects of over-regulation, which impacts not only on business and economic 
enterprise - deregulation is high on conservative political agendas - but on law 
and law's image. 09 It has been suggested that techniques exist to measure the
101 G. Majone (1996) Regulating Europe. London, Roulledge, 56-9.
11)4 R Baldwin (1995) Rules and Government, Oxford, Clarendon
See. C. Hood and C. Scolt (1996) "Bureaucratic Regulation and New' Public Management 
in the United Kingdom: Mirror-Image Developments?", Journal of Law and Society. 23, 321.
C. Scott, “The Juridification of Regulatory Relations in the LIK Utilities Sectors", 
conference paper awaiting publication. Sec also D. Chalmers (1997) "Judicial Preferences and 
the Community Legal Order”, Modem Law Review. 60, 164-7.
107 Annual Report of the Conseil d’Etat for 1993.
108 Majone, op. cit., p.59.




























































































optimum degree of regulation."0 If this is true - which I doubt - then modern 
administrative law has got the balance seriously wrong. Goodin describes1" the 
search for certainty through rules as a mirage. Rules cannot cure the ills of 
discretionary power; they replicate many and substitute others. The NPM 
values of economic, efficient and effective administration require the pendulum 
to swing back towards discretion. There are signs of a move in this direction: in 
the course of this article, we have noted the preference for soft law and 
experiments with negotiated rulemaking,": while a closer look at the field of 
environmental law would reveal a novel form of regulation by contract with 
private entities.
Courts, whose contribution to juridification may go unremarked, in fact 
contribute to juridification in two main ways. First, discretion, a central feature 
of 'trust' systems of public administration, is anathema to control theories of 
administrative law since it tends to be seen as running counter to the certainty 
required by the Rule of Law principle. In many systems of administrative law 
today, control of discretionary power has emerged as a central task for the 
judiciary."1 (It is important to note here that 'soft law' is typically classified 
with discretion). Since rules are seen as the alternative to discretion, judicial 
intervention stimulates formal rulemaking. Rules in turn incite resort to the 
courts to interpret verbal ambiguities and resolve borderline cases. The borders 
may be redrawn. This possibility encourages the growth of more specific and 
complex rules, which in turn produce interpretative problems to be referred to 
courts. The doctrine of direct effect, which encourages detailed provisions in 
directives so that Member States can know the terms of the bargain to which 
they may be deemed to have consented, is a further encouragement to juridify. 
In short, the cycle of juridification is well under way in EC administrative law.
The second major contribution of courts to juridification comes through 
the procedural requirements of due process'. To control theorists, for whom 
courts are at the centre of administrative law, the ECJ is seen as the creator of a 
sophisticated and novel system of procedural protection. But the iron grip of 
the judicial hand can quickly become adamantine. Proceduralism is today 
firmly embedded in Community administrative law. A trend can be observed 
for the Court of First Instance (CFI) to conduct a re-hearing of Commission 
cases. In the celebrated 'Soda Ash' cases, the CFI stated that 'infringement of 
the rights of the defence must... be examined in relation to the specific 
circumstances of each particular case'. It went on to do precisely this, 
effectively granting the applicants a rehearing on the merits. Ehlermann and 
Djriber have observed with dismay"4 how, in the heavily litigated area of
Journal of Law and Society, 19. 405.
11(1 See J Black (1995) ‘"'Which Arrow'’'': Rule Type and Regulatory Policy". Public Law, 94. 
111 R. Goodin (1986) “Welfare. Rights and Discretion", Oxford Journal of Lt'xal Studies, 6, 
232.
1IJ Above, text at note 83 and II c
11' See Harlow and Rawlings, above note 2. Chap. 4; Nolle, above note 44.




























































































competition law, more time is spent on the question whether the Commission 
has followed a proper procedure to reach a decision than on the merits of the 
case itself. Through human rights law and through the constitutionalisation of 
administrative procedures discussed above, trial-type procedures are rapidly 
permeating downwards inside administration. If this process continues 
unchecked, the outcome must be a further transmutation of the Rule of Law 
ideal into sterile proceduralism.
It has to be remembered that we are by and large operating in the 
specialised area of administrative economic law, a point which commentators 
often overlook. This is a sensitive and problematic area which borders on (or 
may overlap with) that of 'white collar crime' and mirrors some of the 
difficulties experienced there.115 The area is one ripe for litigation. The sums at 
stake may be enormous; the players have much to lose; they have access to first 
class legal advice, often in-house; legal costs are merely transaction costs; and 
delay is usually a «airi. Studies of the ECJ docket show it to be dominated by 
corporate bodies. Galanter117 blames American business practices, with their 
'styles of structuring business rules, drafting contracts, regulating financial 
markets and protecting injury victims', for infecting the international legal 
environment with the potent American litigation culture. Litigation is itself a 
form of juridification to which the EC system has already capitulated. 
Litigation is rising steadily and with it, delay. 18 Whatever the causes, and we 
must not discount the entry of new states, any serious increase in caseload will 
necessitate changes to both structure and procedures of Community justice.Ilg 
Yet resort to the courts still receives active support from the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ - through its encouragement of Art. 177 references; through the 
doctrine of direct effect, an explicit encouragement to litigate; and through the 
Francovich principle of state liability.120 Serious work on alternative dispute 
resolution, though clearly necessary, seems to be entirely missing from the
" 5 See Chap. 3. "The Fair Trial Guarantees" in M. Delmas-Marty (ed.) ( 1996) What kind of 
Criminal Policy for Europe '.'. Dordrecht. Kluwer Law International.
Il<’ C. Harding ( 1992) “Who Goes to Court in Europe'.’ An Analysis of Litigation against the 
European Community", European Law Review, 17, 105; F. Fines (1988) Elude de la 
responsabilité extra-contractuelle de la Communauté, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, Annex II, 426-49.
M. Galanter (1994) “Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice", Georgia 
Law Review, 28. 633-74,
118 Statistics published annually by the Court show that, in 1992. the ECJ handled 251 direct 
actions and 162 preliminary references with average delays of 25.8 and 18.8 months. The CFI, 
instituted to lessen the Court's burden, handled 36 actions with an average delay of around 23.3 
months. In 1996, the relevant figures were: ECJ, 132 direct actions and 256 references with 
delays of 19.6 months for direct actions and 20.8 for references. The right of appeal had added 
14 months. The CFI handled 122 actions (no figures are given for delay).
J-P. Jacqué and J. Weiler (1990) “On the Road to European Union - A New' Judicial 
Architecture. An Agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference", Common Market Law Review, 
27, 185.





























































































Majone's regulatory state is evolving in a direction as impersonal as it is 
undemocratic. Do we really wish to live in a juridified society where every 
relationship is governed by rules and where litigation is all-pervasive? 
Moreover, it is not - as Majone suggests - the function of administrative law to 
secure accountability. That is to usurp the role of democratic politics. Law 
cannot fill the void created by the absence of democratic politics nor can the 
democratic deficit of the Community be filled by judges. The path to 
juridification down which we are hastening seems likely to make things worse. 
The political deficit has added judges to the neo-corporatist network of actors - 
regulators, international businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians - who 
dominate post-modern governance. Simply to reconstruct the trust society is 
not, of course, an option. Laying the foundations of a real political Community 
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